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Engaging external actors:  
The EU in the geopolitics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
 
Marco Siddi
Twenty-four years after the beginning of the 
Azeri-Armenian conflict, Baku and Yerevan are 
still at war over the small, mountainous region 
of Nagorno-Karabakh. The area covers 4,400 
square kilometres and is currently controlled 
by the Armenian army, which drove out the 
Azeri population during the 1988-1994 conflict. 
Although a ceasefire was signed in 1994, the 
ensuing conflict resolution talks in the highly 
confidential OSCE Minsk Group (chaired by 
Russia, the United States and France) have failed 
to produce any significant results. Localized armed 
clashes continue to take place on the line of contact 
between the two armies. Most Azeri refugees have 
not settled in the rest of the country; Baku believes 
that their integration outside Nagorno-Karabakh 
would constitute an acceptance of the status quo. 
However, the presence of the Armenian army in 
Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding Azeri 
districts makes their return impossible. Neither 
Yerevan nor Baku will renounce their claims 
to the region. The Armenians consider it their 
cultural cradle and base their territorial demands 
on the principle of self-determination of peoples, 
as Nagorno-Karabakh is now inhabited almost 
exclusively by ethnic Armenians. Azeri claims to 
the disputed area refer to the legal principles of 
territorial integrity and uti possidetis, according 
to which Nagorno-Karabakh should have fallen 
under Baku’s jurisdiction after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. The Charter of the United 
Nations and other key texts of international law 
uphold both the principle of self-determination 
and territorial integrity, but fail to specify which 
one prevails in case of conflict.
Recent developments
Following two decades of failed negotiations, 
the conflicting parties have launched rearmament 
programmes and strengthened their arsenals. 
Azerbaijan has used the large revenues obtained 
from the export of fossil fuels to buy new weapons. 
Its defence budget grew from $175 million in 
2004 to $3.1 billion in 2011, exceeding Armenia’s 
GDP. Baku considers itself to be the main loser 
of the status quo. Azeri president Ilham Aliyev 
has repeatedly declared his intention to resort to 
force if no peaceful settlement can be reached in 
the near future. However, the Armenian army has 
consolidated its positions in Nagorno-Karabakh 
and is prepared to fight a protracted defensive 
campaign. It may also count on Russian support, 
as Yerevan is a member of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Moscow-led 
defence alliance. In addition, Armenia hosts a 
Russian base with approximately 3,000 soldiers 
on its territory.
The vulnerability of Azerbaijan’s vital 
energy infrastructure on the Caspian Sea and 
the uncertainty concerning Russia’s reaction if a 
full-scale conflict breaks out have so far deterred 
Baku from launching an attack. However, a 
snipers’ war is currently taking place along the 
line of contact, with casualties on both sides every 
year. This increases the risk of an accidental war 
through the escalation of skirmishes into all-
out armed conflict. The absence of international 
observers on the line of contact further heightens 
the danger. So far, international involvement 
in conflict resolution efforts has obtained only 
abstract results, most notably the formulation 
of the Madrid principles in 2007. These provide 
guidelines for the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and include: the return to 
Azerbaijan of the territories surrounding Nagorno-
Karabakh and occupied by the Armenian army; 
the deployment of a peace-keeping operation; the 
establishment of a corridor linking Armenia to the 
rest of Nagorno-Karabakh; the determination of 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s final status by referendum; 
the right of return for refugees; and the provision 
of international guarantees for the peace 
settlement. However, the principles leave crucial 
issues unresolved, such as the composition of the 
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peace-keeping operation and the determination of 
a specific date for the referendum. Moreover, both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan are seeking alternatives 
to the Madrid principles. The compromise offered 
by the principles is hardly a viable option in the 
current context of mutual suspicion and hatred 
campaigns fuelled by the media on both sides.
Baku’s and Yerevan’s quest for international 
partners is arguably the most important 
development of the last four years. Following 
the August 2008 war in the South Caucasus, 
Russia paid more attention to security issues 
in the area and attempted to take the initiative 
in mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
as well. Despite the personal involvement of 
President Dmitry Medvedev, no progress was 
made. Armenia is satisfied with the status quo, 
while Azerbaijan is wary of the Russian and 
OSCE mediation. Moscow is Yerevan’s closest 
ally, whereas its relationship with Baku is less 
warm. Azerbaijan has announced its intention to 
become a key transit country and energy supplier 
for the EU, providing an alternative route to the 
Russia-controlled pipelines. Its recent decision to 
dramatically increase the rent of the radar base in 
Gabala, which is part of Russia’s early-warning 
system from Soviet times, may also strengthen 
Russia’s distrust of Baku.
Azerbaijan is keen on moving negotiations 
on Nagorno-Karabakh to other forums, such as 
the United Nations, where it could count on the 
support of numerous other Islamic countries. 
In particular, Turkey became a strategic ally for 
Baku during the last two years. In 2010, a strategic 
partnership was signed and Ankara stepped up 
its military assistance. Turks and Azeris also 
share similar cultural roots and language. Most 
importantly, Ankara and Baku consider Armenia 
a common foe. Given the recent reorientation of 
its foreign policy towards the Middle East, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, Ankara is expected to 
increase its role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The European Union
The European Union has a Special Representative 
for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, 
the French diplomat Philippe Lefort, who focuses 
inter alia on the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Brussels also has diplomatic 
representations in Armenia and Azerbaijan and has 
concluded Action Plans with both countries within 
the framework of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. However, the power of the Special 
Representative is constrained by his exclusion 
from the negotiations of the Minsk Group, the 
lack of active political support from Brussels 
and the absence of clear guidelines for an EU 
conflict resolution policy. Moreover, the Action 
Plans mention the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
only tangentially and in contradictory terms. 
The bilateral Action Plan with Armenia stresses 
the principle of self-determination of peoples, 
while the one with Azerbaijan emphasizes the 
inviolability of territorial integrity. Despite its 
considerable interests in terms of energy security 
and stability of the neighbourhood, the EU has 
maintained a low profile in conflict resolution 
efforts.
Recommendations
1. Given its current lack of access to the conflict 
zone and to the main negotiation forum, the EU 
could address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
in its summits with Russia and Turkey, the key 
external actors in the conflict. Brussels should 
bring them together and mediate the drafting 
of a shared conflict resolution plan. A peace 
proposal supported by the EU, Turkey and 
Russia would be boosted by the powerful 
economic and military leverage that this ‘trio’ 
has on both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
2. Eventually, the EU-Turkish-Russian mediation 
should lead to the deployment of a joint 
monitoring mission or peace-keeping 
operation, with a mixed composition that 
would make it acceptable to both parties.
3. The EU’s negotiations for the Association 
Agreements with Baku and Yerevan 
should be made conditional to the serious 
commitment of both parties to solving the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
4. Brussels should insist on upgrading the 
French chair in the Minsk Group to the 
European level. This would give the EU direct 
access to the main conflict resolution forum. It 
would also allow the EU’s High Representative 
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and/or the Special Representative for the South 
Caucasus to step up their role in negotiations.
5. In the short run, the EU should contribute to 
confidence-building measures. In particular, 
it could become involved in projects that 
foster reconciliation and counter the hatred 
campaigns of Armenian and Azeri media.
6. The EU should revise its Action Plans with 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and remove any 
inconsistency. The revision must include clear 
references to the EU’s unconditional support 
for the Madrid principles.
7. Brussels should enforce an arms embargo 
of all its member states on both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.
